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Resumen 
En la última década del siglo XIX, Reino Unido, Francia y España establecieron tipos progresivos 
en sus impuestos de sucesiones. Este papel compara los procesos legislativos que dos de estos 
países, Francia y España, siguieron en esta cuestión. En ambos casos los argumentos de los 
representantes en los respectivos congresos de los diputados a favor y contra la imposición 
progresiva fueron muy similares y se apoyaron en la autoridad de doctrinas económicas y 
economistas bien conocidos y respetados. El proceso en Francia fue liderado por una mayoría 
de parlamentarios que creían que el impuesto progresivo era un herramienta necesaria para 
alcanzar la justicia en la distribución de la carga fiscal. En España no existió esta mayoría, y la 
reforma fue aprobada en el Congreso debido a otras causas. En los dos países este será un 
paso en la aplicación de nuevas perspectivas sobre justicia fiscal, aunque la proporcionalidad 
impositiva como técnica apropiada, y la negación de las atribuciones a los gobiernos para 
modificar la distribución de la renta eran aún posturas predominantes. 
 
Abstract 
In the last decade of the 19
th
 century, the United Kingdom, France and Spain established 
progressive rates in their succession taxes. This paper compares the legislative processes that 
France and Spain countries followed in this matter. In both cases politicians’ arguments for and 
against progressive taxation were similar, and backed by well-known economic ideas and 
authors. The process in France was leaded by a majority of MPs believing that progressive 
taxes aided in the achievement of real justice in taxpaying. In Spain, there was not this 
majority, but the reform passed due to other circumstances. This would be one step in the 
application of new insights on tax fairness; however, proportionality as the right technique of 
taxation and government refrain from modifying distribution were still predominant. 
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Introduction 
The influence of economic ideas in politics is a crucial field in the study of the phenomena 
related to the diffusion of economic thought. The influence of economic ideas in politicians 
and its display in parliamentarian discussions has been an important topic for research since 
the pioneering works by Fetter (1975, 1980) and Gordon (1976), and has been recently 
continued by Harris (1997), Gambles (1999), Augello and Guidi (2002, 2003, 2005), 
Schonhardt-Bailey (2003, 2006) and Bastien and Cardoso (2009) among other scholars. 
In this framework, fiscal reform is probably one of the most appropriate fields to check the 
influence of economic ideas in politics. Taxation has immediate effects on citizenship, is 
deemed very slippery matter by policymakers and constituency, and raises passionate debates 
in which the idea of justice in the allocation of the burdens of the state is often at stake. This 
paper analyses this intersection between economics and politics taking as a case study the 
introduction of progressive taxes in some European countries at the end of the 19
th
 century, 
the years in which the idea of tax justice grounded on equality of sacrifice was permeating 
politics in Western Europe, broadening the scope for progressivity. This technique was first 
tested in the succession tax. I am here studying the economic ideas lying behind the debates in 
the Parliament on the reforms of the succession taxes in France and Spain, which took place 
almost contemporarily in the last years of the century. 
These debates showed the confrontation between two conceptions of progressivity, always in 
the liberal framework of proportionality taxation as the fair system to allocate tax burden 
among citizens. The vast majority of politicians rejected progressivity as a policy instrument to 
redistribute wealth, as it was not an attribution of the State. On the one side, supporters of 
progressivity believed that this was a useful tool applied to certain taxes (such as succession) in 
order to counteract the regressive effect of indirect taxes (especially consumptions). On the 
other side, detractors of progressivity (mainly conservatives) insisted that progressive taxation 
had no limits, and it entailed a risk to capital and therefore to the country’s economic growth 
and welfare. Both parties grounded their positions on fiscal ideas, which reflected the debate 
that economists maintained at that time on the issue of taxation justice. Quotations of well-
known economists were common, although to some extent instrumental, and insidiously 
imprecise. In any case, MPs taking part in these debates both in France and Spain knew the 
fiscal literature and praxis of other countries connected to the issue of progressivity. This 
paper attempts at showing how these ideas did show in the debates and therefore had 
trespassed academic boundaries and had arrived to political scene in the parliaments. 
 
The reform of the succession tax: Two different stories 
Attempts to introduce progressive rates in the succession tax in France had been taken place 
since the mid decades of the 19
th
 century: In 1848 the Finance Minister Goudchaux launched a 
bill proposing a progressive tax on successions and donations.
1
 Other bills –sponsored by the 
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government, the parliament budget commission, or MPs– came out the following years, 
especially at the end of the decade of 1880 and early 1890s, generally demanding deduction of 
debts in the assessment of the tax bill and proposing progressive rates to compensate the 
consequent decrease in revenues.
2
 In Spain, on the contrary, a progressive inheritance tax was 
quite a novelty included in the government’s public budget bill for 1900. 
The process leading to the definitive establishment of the progressive succession tax in France 
(Law 25 February 1901) started in 1894. Finance Minister Burdeau issued a bill (February 1894) 
which included the deduction of debts in the assessment of the tax bill, increasing current 
proportional rates to offset the decrease in tax receipts.
3
 However, the report by the budget 
commission (July 1894) suggested establishing a progressive scale to be applied to the brackets 
of the inheritance received by every heir.
4
 The chairman of the commission, Dupuy-Dutemps, 
justified progressivity on justice and utility: Every citizen should contribute on behalf of his 
ability to pay, but this was not proportional to his fortune and even less to his income. 
Contrary to the income tax (which required “humiliating inquisition”), succession tax had a 
good basis to set progressive rates. On the other hand, as a consequence of debts deduction, 
these progressive rates were necessary, not to harm the poor.
5
 
By the time the report was issued, Poincaré was the new Finance Minister. While accepting the 
principle of progressivity ("[the Government] believes it is fair and wise"), he considered that 
the commission's project had flaws, particularly an excessive number of steps, which made the 
tax difficult to manage, and too high top rates, especially on direct successions. Poincaré’s new 
bill (25 July 1894) kept the deduction of passive in the assessment of the tax bill, which he 
deemed a long-term aspiration of agrarian interests, with the aim of relieving transmission of 
real estate.
6
 But its main peculiarity lied in the establishment of “graduate rates” on the wealth 
transferred, a radical change in French tax system and “a firmly democratic transformation”.
7
 
Poincaré however made it clear the idea that applying progressive rates in the inheritance tax 
did not imply accepting the general principle of progressive taxation. He justified progressivity 
in this case on behalf of the principle of ability to pay: He proposed “progressional rates” (as 
he called them), because ability to pay was bigger in the case of the inheritances, as it is the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1
 The reasoning was that, as this was wealth acquisition consequence of chance and society guaranteed 
property right to the receiver, tax rates should increased as the amount received grew. Stourm (1905), 
pp. 222-240. 
2
 Until the reform of 1901 and 1902, the inheritance tax rates were proportional, they charged a 5% rate 
on real estate and 1,25% on other assets, with 6 different categories depending on the degree of 
consanguinity. In each of these 6 schedules, tax rates were different, increasing from direct successions 
(1,25%) to inheritances to third parties (11,25%). 
3
Annales de la Chambre des Députés. Documents Parlementaires (from now on ACD-DC) (1894), 
Annexes t. I, Annexe 350, pp. 126-131. 
4
 The commission set 7 degrees of consanguinity, each one divided into 17 progressive steps. Rates 
ranged from 1,25% to 10,25% for direct successions, and from 15,50% to 24,50% for successions beyond 
6th degree. Brackets under 1000 FF would pay 0,5%. Donations would follow this schedule too. 
5
 ACD-DC (1894), Annexes t. II, Annexe 770, pp. 452-466. Dupuy leant his discourse on J.S. Mill’s ideas. 
6
 This exemption had always been rejected on behalf of the difficulties to control fake debts, and 
therefore fraud. However, doctrinal basis for this rejection also existed, grounded on a radical version of 
the idea of taxation as payment in exchange for services supplied by the State. 
7
 ACD-DC (1894), Annexes t. II, Annexe 885, p. 626. 
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case of wealth acquired with no effort, often unexpectedly.
8
 Quoting Passy, this tax only 
reduced the advantages linked to the unexpected acquisition of wealth. Poincaré believed that 
taxes were not a mere insurance premium or payment in exchange for a service supplied by 
the state: In this case rates would not differ on behalf of consanguinity. On the contrary, rates 
grew as consanguinity decreased, as inheritance was increasingly unexpected. The increase in 
rates as the inherited share increases was grounded on the same basis. He however, put aside 
the question whether normal ability of taxpayers is strictly proportional to their resources and 
therefore taxes on every income should respect this proportionality, focusing only on the 
succession tax: In this case, the question was to assess the exceptional ability to pay, which is a 
consequence of a particular event, and to charge this accidental wealth increase. The largest 
this increase, the largest the advantage law guarantees the heirs, and the largest the ability to 
pay tax. Progressive rates should be moderate in order to be accepted by the public and to 
avoid fraud. It would also serve to make the tax burden of small inheritances lighter, 
particularly direct inheritances, which was the most common case.
9
 Poincaré’s progressive 
rates had 7 schedules, depending on the degree on consanguinity. Rates in the lowest 
schedule (direct successions) ranged from 1% to 2,50%. Rates in the highest (beyond 6
th
 grade) 
ranged from 15% to 18,50% (compared to 1,25% to 10,25% and 15,50% to 24,50% in the 
Commission report). The degree of consanguinity was the main factor in setting the schedule, 
over the amount inherited: Therefore, progressivity –and thus ability to pay– was mostly not 
connected to the increase in wealth, but with the expectations of this increase of wealth. 
The budget commission (November 1894), chaired by Doumer, worried by the public deficit, 
suggested increasing the progressive rates especially in the highest brackets (it also decreased 
them in the lowest brackets): They would rate between 0,5% and 3% in direct successions and 
15% to 19,50% for third parties. The commission did not set a doctrine on progression –there 
was not agreement–, but the report stated that a large number of commissioners did believe 
that progressive taxes fulfilled better the requirement of ability to pay in proportion to one’s 
faculties: Ability to pay was not proportional to wealth, but progressive, and they believed that 
all direct taxes should establish progressivity, as this would restore real proportionality 
destroyed by indirect taxes.
10
 It deemed Poincaré’s rates symbolic, as they were too small: 
Differences between degrees of consanguinity were high, but not inside the schedules: “It is 
like a staircase that doesn’t go up”.
11
 This new scale of rates was accepted by Poincaré and 
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 “Ces facultés sont ici plus grandes qu’en toute autre matière, parce que l’impôt frappe le redevable au 
moment où il s’enrichit sans effort, sans travail, souvent d’une manière inespérée». ACD-DC (1894), 
Annexes t. II, Annexe 885, p. 627. He also backed his argument on the opinions by Mill and Garnier. 
9
 Actually, Poincaré’s project benefitted mostly direct successions under 10.000 FF, they resulting better 
off than either with old proportional rates or the Commission plan. This allowed the minister saying that 
“according to us, this is the major reason why graduate system should be accepted”. ACD-DC (1894), 
Annexes t. II, Annexe 885, p. 628. Donation tax rates remained proportional. Finally, Poincaré pointed 
out that the principle of progression was widely accepted in other advanced countries, England being 
the example, with the Harcourt reform. Besides, he expected an increase in succession tax revenues of 
almost 8%, which would be applied to balance the budget in the following year, 1895. 
10
 ACD-DC (1894), Annexes t. II, Annexe 968, p. 416. It nevertheless stated that other commissioners 
rejected the principle of progressivity but accepted it for successions (as it was the case of Poincaré), 
and a small number of them rejected all progressivity. 
11
 The report studied then how to limit the arbitrariness of progressive rates, trying to search a rational 
and mathematical method to set them. Finally the Commission posed the example of England, whose 
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included in the bill of the budget for 1895.
12
 By then, MPs had started preparing for the debate 
in the Chamber. Some of them had issued bills against progressivity and others in favor of 
limiting the right to inherit.
13
 At the end of January 1895 the Perier cabinet resigned. The new 
Finance Minister Ribot suggested postponing the debate on the succession tax, which was 
again slightly reformed.
14
 Eventually, the debate took place in the Chamber in November 1895. 
After the passing of the bill, the project again delayed its discussion in the Senate, until it 
would be eventually discussed in 1910 and turned into a law in February 1902. 
Contrary to the French case, in Spain progressive taxation started being debate with the 
project to reform the succession tax in 1899, in the framework of a broader reform in the tax 
system, launched by the conservative Finance Minister Villaverde.
15
 This reform strove to 
improve tax system efficiency, and therefore public revenues, with the aim of reducing public 
debt and balancing the budget. The main innovations were a new tax on some income sources, 
new taxes on specific consumption goods (alcohol and sugar), and a reform of the general tax 
on property transmissions (including the succession tax). He completed these reforms with 
reductions in public expenditure and restrictive monetary policy. The leitmotiv of the plan was 
to increase revenues and reduce expenses without disturbing credit or public services.
16
 
One of the most striking novelties in this reform was the introduction of progressive rates in 
the inheritance tax. Up to then, its fees were proportional and varied according to 
consanguinity. Rates ranged from 1% to 9%. Some extraordinary surcharges had been recently 
imposed on behalf of current economic crisis, making fees 40% higher. Villaverde’s project 
established several scales of rates, depending on consanguinity, each one with five steps 
depending on the amount inherited. In the first schedule (direct successions) fees ranged from 
1% to 2,50%.
17
 In the last scale (inheritances to third parties), they ranged from 11% to 13%. 
So, Spanish progressive rates were milder than French. The inheritance tax did not furnish 
much to the Treasury: According to the budget project for 1900, its revenues were 2% of the 
budget. It was a small tax, but its significance was high, as it fell harder on wealthy citizens, 
well represented in the Parliament. Progressivity was not new, however: Two small taxes 
(officials' salaries and personal identification documents) applied progressive rates. Nor was it 
completely new in the Chamber, as some MPs had defended it before occasionally.
18
 But the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
progressive rates were, according to Harcourt, “moderate”, pointing out that the Commission’s proposal 
was even more moderate. 
12
 It readjusted the rates of progressivity increasing slightly marginal rates (main change was augmenting 
marginal rate in direct successions from 3 to 4%. ACD-DC (1895), Annexes t. I, pp. 9-12. 
13
 See for instance ACD-DC (1894), Annexes t. III, Annexes 1030, 1117 and 1432. 
14
 ACD-DC (1895), Annexes t. III, Annexe 1553, p. 7. 
15
 Villaverde had been appointed minister in the Silvela cabinet formed after the war against the United 
States and subsequent loss of the last colonies 1898. This disaster led intellectuals and politicians to call 
for the regeneration of the nation. One of the key topics in this regard was healing public finances. 
16
 Solé (1999), pp. 29-30. In spite of new fiscal trends spreading in Europe towards tax personalization, 
Villaverde kept the traditional product tax system, discarding fundamental tax reorganization in order 
not to jeopardize revenues. (Recently, Comín has stated that Villaverde’s reform was conceptually 
obsolete, as new fiscal principles on taxation fairness were already circulating in Europe. Comín (2010), 
p. 231). It seems that Villaverde was an enthusiastic follower of the British income tax, although rejected 
the idea of introducing it in Spain due to the enormous difficulties he foresaw. 
17
 Diario de Sesiones, Congreso de los Diputados (from now, DSC), 1899-1900, 14, appendix 9, pp. 11-12. 
18
 Some public finance officials had also supported it. DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4044; and 119, p. 4059. 
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first general debate on this matter took place when Villaverde brought to the Chamber his tax 
reform plan, in the 1899-1900 campaign.
19
 
Villaverde strongly committed himself to the defense of the progressive inheritance tax 
(against the opinion of many of his fellow conservatives), and he eventually got his project to 
pass the Chamber proceeding (conservatives, despite not sympathizing with the reform, voted 
for it, not to make the cabinet fall). However, as probably many MPs expected, it did not get 
the Senate pass, which opened an institutional crisis. The only progressive measure the Senate 
agreed to pass was a tax threshold for the lowest inheritances.  The reform was settled by the 
Law of 2 April 1900. Although Villaverde did not succeed in his attempt to establish a 
progressive tax, he nevertheless had sowed a crucial idea: A real progressive inheritance tax 
was established by Cobián in 1910. In all, his general reform project faced hard opposition, and 
he eventually was constrained to mollify his proposals in order to get the Chamber pass.
20
 
 
The parliamentary debates: Two similar stories 
The debate on the succession tax is quite parallel in France and Spain. Discussions in the 
Chamber of deputies followed similar patterns and the arguments for and against progressivity 
were almost coincident. Quotations of economic literature existed in both cases, sources being 
essentially the same. Both debates were long and tough. In Spain, despite it being a minor tax, 
this was the longest debate on Villaverde’s reforms, and was extraordinarily controversial. In 
France, the Chamber also devoted many sessions to its discussion. There is a significant 
political difference, however. In Spain, the reform was proposed by the conservative cabinet. 
The republican party (moderate left) supported it. The liberal party (progressive) opposed. In 
France, it was the progressive republican cabinet that sponsored progressivity, supported by 
the left, whereas MPs from the centre-right led the opposition. Eventually, both projects 
passed the Chamber procedure but then faced difficulties: In France the reform was passed in 
November 1895; however, it was suspended and, after being discussed in the Senate in 1901, 
turned into a Law in 1902. In Spain the project was discussed in January 1900, and then 
aborted in the Senate, except for a tax exemption to lowest inheritances. A progressive 
succession tax would be eventually established in 1910.  
The idea that proportional taxation should be the norm was not challenged by the vast 
majority of MPs in both countries. At most, progressivity in the inheritance tax was a way to 
restore real proportionality lost as a consequence of the regressive effects of indirect taxes. In 
France positions were more varied, due to the presence of a larger number of left MPs, some 
of who stood for a progressivity of much larger scope (and even the suppression of 
inheritances to distant relatives or limit the right to inherit). Debates were structured in two 
                                                           
19
 Delay in the parliamentary discussion of economic bills led Villaverde to issue a new bill on the 
inheritance tax which would allow it to rule immediately on a provisional basis. In this new bill, the 
progressive steps had been slightly modified (steps were 8 instead of 5, and fees ranged between 1 and 
2,75%; new rates hardly favoured medium-size inheritances. See DSC 1899-1900, 108, appendix 8. 
20
 Villaverde linked his remaining in office to the general acceptance of his plans, which created 
difficulties to the cabinet, as many conservative MPs were reluctant to pass some reform bills. Martorell 
(2000), pp. 68-69. Having attained just a part of his plans, he resigned on July 1900. However, his 
measures eventually managed to balance the Spanish budget and to reduce the public debt. 
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main directions: Justice in taxation (whether a progressive succession tax could contribute to 
achieve a fairer allocation of citizen’s total tax burden) and the utility or convenience of the 
reform. As for MPs intervention in the debate, patterns were similar: many MPs spoke 
occasionally, with mainly political discourses, and just a handful of MPs (around 10 in both 
cases) really went into the matter in depth, they showing a good degree of competence in 
fiscal matters. These parliamentarian economists were not in general linked to academic posts; 
their economic expertise was acquired through university Law degrees, long careers as public 
officials in economic-related positions, and as politicians specialized in economic discussions. 
Many of them had held significant economic posts in the public administration.
21
 Ideas and 
writings by renowned economists often emerged, but, needless to say, MPs' political aims 
made arguments and quotations from economists as sources of authority often not strict. 
In support of progressivity: Attain a proportional tax system 
The immediate cause to set up progressive rates in the succession tax in France was the 
discount of debts in the assessment of the tax bill. The reduction in revenues should be offset 
increasing tax rates. It was decided to do it through a progressive scale on behalf of three 
reasons: First, it is a fairer allocation of tax burden, as the tax system is regressive, and thus it 
is a way of compensation. Second, succession tax is particularly harmful to small rural real 
estate; a tax relief to these successions should be applied. Third, inheritance is a free and 
unexpected increase in wealth, therefore ability to pay is supposed higher. As for Spain, the 
main reasoning to impose progressive rates was the first one (although it was never very 
clearly stated). It was also stressed the increase in revenues that the reform would supply, 
essential to balance the budget. 
Compensating the structural unfairness of tax system was the most important argument. The 
French Finance Minister Doumer, mentioned it in some occasions: “Si l’on cherche l’ensemble 
des taxes pesant sur les contribuables, on peut dire que la répartition de l’impôt est en 
progression avec la misère de ceux qui le payent […]. Ce que nous demandons, c’est de réparer 
les injustices qui existent, que tout le monde proclame […] il faut, en se guidant sur un idéal de 
justice et de progrès, marcher vers une répartition des impôts qui soit plus juste, plus 
équitable que notre système fiscal actuel”. This was a step to democracy based on a principle 
of justice.
22
 Almost all MPs defending progressivity pegged to this argument, which implied 
that tax justice lied in a proportional system. This broad argument combined with the idea that 
progressive rates affected the inherited wealth, and not income (the product of work and 
saving): Citizens should contribute according to their ability to pay; as inheritances are an 
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 In the Spanish case, a significant group of these MPs had been (or would be) appointed Finance 
Ministers: Liberals Moret, López Puigcerver, Gamazo, Suárez Inclán and Canalejas; and conservatives 
Bergamín and Villaverde. This confirms Almenar’s view that, since 1891, the participation of university 
professors in politics decreased sharply in a context of political professionalisation and divorce between 
academia and politics. Almenar (2005), pp. 86-92. The high quality of the debate was praised by some of 
its participants: Azcárate, Laiglesia and Gamazo. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4058 and 4073 ; 120, p. 4093. 
22
 Annales de la Chambre des Députés. Débats Parlementaires (from now on ACD-DP) (1895), t. 47, pp. 
219-220. “Je disais que la plupart de nos impôts et de nos taxes pèsent sur le contribuable en proportion 
inverse de son revenue; ils frappent la propriété au rebours de son importance. Comme compensation, 
nous demandons une taxe légèrement progressive sur les successions”. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 267. 
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accidental and free wealth increase, ability likewise increased.
23
 Actually, this was the reason 
why, according to many MPs, progressivity was acceptable in the succession tax but not in the 
income tax: It taxed property, not individuals.
24
 And this was also the reason why progressivity 
should not apply to other taxes. According to Darlan, “this project does not imply accepting 
the principle of progressivity in general. Therefore it does not contradict any principle of 
political economy”.
 25
 In no way supporters of progressivity believed it should be a distributive 
instrument. As Trouillot said, "this is not a threat to property or wealth, it is not and indirect 
expropriation, this is not a leveler of fortunes" (which he believed would only bring equal 
poverty, and end of welfare). "These worries are chimerical, not real”.
26 
MPs standing for progressivity used other arguments too: The project helped rural property, (a 
point in which all French MPs agreed).
27
 Defenders of the progressive system also believed 
that it was financially sound: revenues would be enough to offset the decreases caused by the 
exemption of debts and the reduction in rates for small inheritances (worries to balance the 
budget were also behind the struggle to increase fiscal revenues).
28
 The argument of a 
widespread fiscal use was present many times, especially making reference to the British case 
whose rates were higher.
29
 Some left MPs suggested further reforms beyond the government’s 
bill: Darlan proposed suppressing inheritances beyond the 6th grade, using these revenues to 
discharge transfer of rural real estate properties. Jaurès and other socialists also suggested 
using the revenues to discharge property transfer of small rural real estate and to finance 
retirement pensions to workers.
30
 
In Spain, the preamble of the inheritance tax reform bill stated that the introduction of 
progressive rates was a means to compensate a reduction in the fees of the other major item 
of the tax on property transmission, inter-vivos transfers (done in order to encourage trade). 
The new progressive structure of the inheritance tax would benefit poorest classes by reducing 
the actual rates they paid, whereas the tax burden would fall comparatively harder on large 
inheritances, as their beneficiaries had a larger ability to pay. This “fits better the principles of 
equity and distributive fairness, which call for alleviation of levies on small capitals, in order to 
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 Darlan stated that rates charging more high inheritances than small correspond to a sense of equity; 
this does not violate any economic principle. "It is a principle of democratic justice". ACD-DP (1895), t. 
47, p. 134. Doumer insisted people had to pay taxes in proportion to their faculties; in the succession 
tax, this proportion was given by progressivity: “It is a matter of justice”. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 219. 
Actually, this argument was behind the variable rates according to consanguinity, which existed in the 
old succession tax. 
24
 Trouillot, ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 173. He was the spokesman of the budget commission.  
25
 Darlan ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, 134 and 137. 
26
 Trouillot, ACD-DP (1895), t. 47,  p. 172.  
27
 Many MPs stressed this, for instance Darlan or Lhopiteau. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 263. However, 
some MPs in favor of progressivity still acknowledged that land resulted overcharged. Turrel (radical 
republican) said:“Depuis l’école des physiocrates on semble croire que la terre seule est la source de 
tout et doit tout payer”. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 332. 
28
 Cochery, the chairman of the budget commission, and also Trouillot were very insistent on this point. 
ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 172. Trouillot pointed out that the main objective of the reform was to subtract 
passive in the assessment of the tax bill. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 259 
29
 Doumer highlighted that the English succession tax reform was much more progressive: Direct 
successions arrived to a rate of 8%, but adding the succession duty to the Estate duty, this rate 
increased up to 9,5%. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 219. Also Darlan, ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 134. 
30
 ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 292-293 and 334. 
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make taxpaying less onerous and easier”.
31
 Surprisingly enough, Villaverde and his fellows did 
not have unified criteria to defend the reform bill and sometimes contradicted themselves.
32
 
They struggled to convince the Chamber that the new progressive rates were not redistributive 
nor a threat to wealth. 
Villaverde tried not to cling to the argument of progressivity as compensating device. His main 
line of reasoning was simply rejecting the existence of any progressivity in his reform: It just 
involved what he called “progressional proportionality”, the system of limited progressivity 
devised by Garnier.
33
 He was thus trying to distance from the distributive (and socialist) 
connotations of progressivity. However, he ended up acknowledging that relief of poor classes 
was a matter of correction of unfair allocation of tax burden: Villaverde claimed that he 
needed to charge direct inheritances with a fee of 1,70% to balance the budget. By using 
progressive rates, he relieved poorer classes, fulfilling the Constitutional requirement of 
establishing a proportional tax system. Then, the succession tax turned out to be not 
progressive, but degressive: its goal was to reduce the tax burden on small fortunes.34 Thus 
Villaverde’s plan of a limited progressivity was the result of combining public finance 
requirements and constitutional justice commands, but it was also a consequence of his 
fidelity to the fiscal principle of ability to pay in the allocation of tax burden to attain tax 
justice. In order to accomplish this –what he called “proportionality of faculties”–, it was 
necessary to implement a progressive system in some taxes.
35
 Republican Azcárate also 
interpreted the constitutional “proportionality” as “proportionality of faculties”, an idea that 
allowed him to support the progressive system in the Garnier fashion: The “progressional” tax 
fitted well with the values of freedom and justice, the pure proportional system being unfair. 
Its application in some taxes was in order to achieve the equality of sacrifice in taxpaying.
36
 
Villaverde insisted on the limits of his reform by other means. First, he rejected the idea of 
using taxes as a mechanism to modify wealth distribution, as a socialist tool to equal 
fortunes.
37
 Azcárate agreed: using taxation as an instrument for social reform was a mistake.
38
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 DSC 1899-1900, 14, appendix 9, p. 2. 
32
 Villaverde had to rectify the argument used by his fellow MP Fernández Hontoria, who had said that 
the progressive scale was a device to correct the overall regressivity of the tax system. The reform was a 
mechanism to achieve tax justice, looking for the real proportionality commanded by the Constitution. 
DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4029. 
33
 This was a powerful reason, as it was grounded on an idea by a famous liberal economist, which had 
been adopted by authors as J.B. Say and J.S. Mill. See Garnier (1846). 
34
 DSC 1899-1900, 118, pp. 4036-4039. Laiglesia called Villaverde’s proposal of progressivity as a 
“modern proportionality” and remarked that liberals' suggestion to establish a tax threshold was a real 
progressivity. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4075. 
35
 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4040. In another occasion, Villaverde stated that taxes were citizen’s 
contribution in proportion to wealth, so that the State could exist: This “proportion” was sometimes 
better achieved through a graduated scale. This, he said, was Léon Say’s doctrine, which he assured to 
follow. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4060. 
36
 He stated that the constitutional order to pay taxes according to the individual ability should not be 
interpreted restrictively, as if it stood for pure proportionality. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4061 and 4068. 
37
 “This is not a progressive tax; a progressive tax […], as it has been defended by the Chair Socialists in 
their books and lectures, and as it has been defended by action socialists in their programs, is a fiscal 
device with which the State intervenes in the distribution of wealth. It entails a constant, continuous 
and practical progression, equal or bigger than the progression of wealth; it tends to make fortunes 
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He only considered progressivity legitimated in the framework of the theory of compensation: 
Progressivity was not really fair, but it served to compensate the tax burden excess on lower 
classes caused by indirect taxes.
39
 Second, Villaverde also denied that progressivity had been 
established as a compensatory device: Although the “progressional” technique of taxing used 
direct taxes to counteract the relatively greater harm caused to low-income economies by 
indirect taxes, there was no need of this effect of compensation in Spain. This was because, in 
his opinion, taxes on consumption turned out to be mostly direct taxes, as in practice they 
were managed as surcharges on the main direct taxes on agricultural and industrial activities 
returns. Here he seemed to contradict his argument on constitutional real proportionality, 
probably with the aim of guaranteeing the Chamber that the reform would not lead to an 
extension of progressivity to other taxes.
40
 Third, progressivity supporters denied that the 
inheritance tax could hamper capital accumulation or threaten economic growth, because it 
was extremely small.
41
 The lack of tax threshold (claimed by some parliamentarians, including 
Azcárate, and described by Villaverde as a true progressivity) was a sort of contradiction in 
Villaverde’s plan, he being aware of this. Fernández Hontoria acknowledged that a tax 
exemption would be desirable, but it was not possible to apply because the Treasury could not 
dispense with those revenues.
42
 The ultimate aim of the whole fiscal reform –to  reorganise 
the tax system in order to increase revenues– was  always present. As Laiglesia pointed out, 
the object of the entire project was both to strengthen direct taxes and to find new fiscal 
resources, mainly taxing activities that so far had escaped taxation.
43
 
Arguments against progressivity: Jeopardise capital 
The arguments that MPs used in both countries to oppose progressive taxation were similar, 
although in every country opposition stressed them differently. They took several directions: 
First, the problem of arbitrariness;
44
 second, the problem of the expansion of progressivity; 
third, fears of the effect of high taxation on investment and economic growth. Finally, there 
was the problem of justifying progressivity on behalf of fiscal justice. 
First problem of progressivity was arbitrariness of rates. The project replaced a fixed base with 
another which could be modified indefinitely: The limits between moderate and excessive 
                                                                                                                                                                          
equal […] This is not, therefore, a fiscal mechanism to intervene in wealth distribution; it is a financial 
tool, seeking proportionality”. DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4040. 
38
 “There is a school […] which supports progressive taxation, what for? Wagner has stated it, he making 
a glaring error; he has stated that time has arrived for this tax to cease to be a mere fiscal device; it must 
become a tool for social reform. And this is a fundamental error: this tax will never be other than a fiscal 
device”. Social reforms should be done through laws, not taxes. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4060. 
39
 In his opinion, this was the idea supported by Leroy-Beaulieu and Léon Say. Azcárate explicitly 
rejected Wagner’s idea of using taxes for social transformation through wealth redistribution. DSC 1899-
1900, 119, p. 4060. 
40
 DSC 1899-1900, 120, p. 4106. 
41
 Laiglesia, the chairman of the budget commission, estimated that this tax amounted just 1,26% of the 
total tax base, according to 1890-91 statistics and assuming that domestic product had remained 
constant. Villaverde believed that a maximum tax rate of 2,75% could hardly damage capital. He insisted 
that his project did not raise tax rates, but, on the contrary, lowered them (he was taking into account 
the effect of the temporary surcharges). DSC 1899-1900, 119, pp. 4064-4065; and 120, pp. 4105-4112. 
42
 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4029. 
43
 DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4075. 
44
 It has remained the main flaw of progressivity. Neumark (1994), pp. 189-197; Slemrod (1994), pp. 1-4. 
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rates are vague.
45
 In narrow connection to this question there was the issue of the extension of 
progressivity: This reform could be an open door to the establishment of progressivity in other 
taxes.
46
 In particular, there was fear that progressivity could be applied to the income tax, 
which had been already discussed in the French Chamber and would be soon established. 
According to Ramel, this was an attempt to introduce progressivity in the whole tax system, 
particularly in income taxation, “with all its humiliating and odious consequences”. In his 
opinion, shared by many other MPs, the 1789 Constitution stood for proportionality as the 
best system to achieve equality and fairness in taxpaying.
47
 Alleged compensatory effect was 
also arguable. Labat said that the inequality caused by indirect taxes was essentially local, and 
very diverse; a national tax could not solve this problem.
48
 To Cochin, it was not clear that 
indirect taxes fell always harder on the poor; some fell just on property. Therefore there was 
no need for compensation.
49
 
Arguments stressing the excess in tax burden to capitals also emerged. Capitals would flee to 
other countries, hindering the nation’s wealth and economic growth.
50
 As a consequence, only 
land property will pay the tax. This was quite a strong argument, and some supporters of 
progressivity reckoned it: Financial assets would escape taxation, whereas rural real estate 
would support the entire tax burden. Those most charged would be small rural proprietors. 
Méline alerted of a fall in prices of rural real estate, and of the effect of liquidizing part of the 
heritage to pay for the succession tax.
51
 Moreover, eventual revenues will decrease.
52
 Actually, 
inefficiency of the reform was another big question. One of its objectives was to increase 
revenues in order to balance the budget. But according to Labat, this would require very high 
marginal rates, confiscatory rates which can lead the economic system to disorder and chaos. 
But this would not produce enough revenues, as there were few high inheritances. The tax 
would just result a leveller of fortunes.
53
 
Many opponents to progressive taxation issued diverse proposals to try to replace it. Some of 
them suggested a special tax on financial assets, to avoid them committing fraud: Lemire; Rey; 
Gamard. Labat directly proposed keeping proportional rates, although increased (and devoting 
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 Labat and Rose supported this idea. Lasteyrie also suggested a system limiting progressivity, that he 
called degressive. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 268. 
46
 Labat and Say agreed in this. Rose pointed out the contradiction of accepting progressive succession 
tax but not income tax. A progressive income tax was more easily justified, as the idea of progression 
should be applied to total income, as this shows well taxpayer’s ability to pay. Rose rejected both, but 
stated that it was preferable on income. Some MPs pointed out that the progressivity had the same 
difficulties in the income tax as in the succession tax, essentially inquisition. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 175. 
47
 Ramel, in ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 222-223.  
48
 Labat ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 127. 
49
 Cochin, ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 174. 
50
 Labat stressed that the interests of employers and workers were not opposed, quite a common 
reasoning in conservative circles at that time. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 131. 
51
 Meline, ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, pp. 260-264. “Vous faites une experience des plus hasardées et qui peut 
être désastreuse». The more increment in succession rates, the more land will lose value. 
52
 Rose, Cochin Gamard, in ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, pp. 169-170, 176, 255. Labat also insisted on small 
taxes as the key to high revenues: leaving capital circulate and taxing them smoothly every time they 
change proprietor would render higher revenues to the government. ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 130. 
53
 ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 266. 
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revenues to public assistance in rural areas).
54
 All these motions were rejected, but annoyed 
the Finance Minister Doumer, who accused Gamard and Méline of trying to postpone the 
passing of the law.
55
 Finally, the project was passed 397 to 123. Despite some members of the 
majority did not agree with the progressive rates, they accepted the project as it allowed debts 
to de deduced and also lowered rates to small inheritances, thus aiding small rural property. 
On the other side, socialists supported it as a step in the direction of fortune levelling. 
The strategy of the Spanish opposition in the succession tax reform debate was to prove that 
progressivity was not a fair system of allocating tax burden. Their chief argument was that 
progressive taxes implied wealth redistribution, which was unacceptable: this was a socialist 
idea that bestowed the State with prerogatives it should not have at all. López Puigcerver 
maintained that tax progressivity was not justified by any theory on fiscal justice, but by the 
(socialist) theory of the redistributive State, which deemed taxation to be a major tool to 
eliminate social inequalities, not just instruments for the State to fulfil its duties.
56
 Moret 
stressed that tax relief for small fortunes, which progressivity entailed, should not imply higher 
tax rates for the rich. In his opinion, tax relief for the poor was not a matter of social justice but 
of fiscal techniques: cost-benefit calculation (collecting costs were higher than the revenues 
supplied), and the principle of not destroying taxpaying capacity.
57
 Liberal MPs also attacked 
the argument of compensatory progressivity: Gamazo and López Puigcerver, stated that, at 
least in the case of Spain, there was no need to compensate lower classes, because there were 
several taxes that were paid only by the top-income group, which already generated this 
compensatory effect.
58
  
The third big argument against progressivity, linked to the distributive reason, showed the 
social question beneath this issue and perhaps the chief controversy of the reform: Progressive 
tax rates put property and wealth at risk. López Puigcerver openly feared that applying it to 
new taxes would be very dangerous. He ardently warned that this matter transcended politics; 
what was at stake was the fundamentals of the political system of the Restoration: propriety, 
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 Lemire, ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p.225. ; Rey, p.234; Gamard, p.255-256. Also left MPs suggested a 
surcharge on financial assets, in addition to progressive rates. For instance, Bascou, ACD-DP (1895), t. 
47,  p. 290. 
55
 “Je m’étonne que l’honorable M. Méline soit venu ici, quelque qualifié qu’il soit, nous parler, à propos 
de cette loi, de l’intérêt de l’agriculture». ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, p. 262. 
56
 “Whatever the theory might be to justify or explain this tax […] you will not find any idea of justice to 
justify it; you will only find a single theory to explain it; and this is the theory of those who believe that 
the State must intervene in the distribution of wealth; the theory of those who believe that taxes are 
not a means for the State to fulfill its duties and to meet the budget expenditure; the theory of those 
who believe that taxes are something to make social inequalities to be eliminated”. DSC 1899-1900, 118, 
p. 4032. However, some liberals accepted a certain degree of anticyclical fiscal policy: Gamazo and 
Moret believed that the government could never use taxes to create the economic cycle, but the latter 
admitted that it could “steer” it. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4072; and 120, p. 4097. 
57
 “This is not progressive, regressive or progressional: This is, simply, a matter of common sense”. DSC 
1899-1900, 119, pp. 4071-4072. 
58
 Gamazo considered that the taxes paid only by upper classes amounted more than 20% of the total 
tax revenues. In his opinion, it would be good to implement other measures, such as a tax threshold to 
achieve a higher degree of equity, but a progressive tax on capital, as he considered the inheritance tax, 
should be never established. DSC 1899-1900, 120, p. 4095. López Puigcerver believed that the tax 
structure in Spain compensated lower and upper classes, although he admitted that, in other countries, 
circumstances could be different, such as in England. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4068. 
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wealth, capital and business. López, who explicitly grounded these beliefs Léon Say and Leroy-
Beaulieu’s works, tried here to invoke all MPs to defend the essence of the social system. His 
appealing to general class interest shows the intersection of vested interests and politics in the 
Chamber.
59
 Canalejas, a radical liberal MP stated that passing Villaverde's bill implied truly 
sanctioning the principle of progressivity, which many fellow conservatives feared, but did not 
dare to express frankly.
60
 Azcárate, also believed that, despite the fact that progressivity 
already existed in the tax system, it has only caused concern when applied to property.
61
 
Last, liberals also clung to a range of other reasons: The tax on property transmission was 
illegitimate as it levied capital, not incomes, violating the principle that taxes should never 
destroy future taxpaying capacity. This kind of taxes prevented capital accumulation, hindering 
economic growth and thus harming the working class. Progressive rates made these state of 
affairs worse, and besides resulted in lower tax revenues, as they stimulated fraud.
62
 
Progressivity could not be fair, as rates were always arbitrarily established, and it did not take 
into account taxpayer’s personal circumstances (this reasoning could also be applied to 
proportionality, but, as Suárez Inclán pointed out, progressivity aggravated it).
63
 Finally, the 
lack of tax threshold was deemed a strong contradiction in the reform, as Villaverde had said 
that his progressive plan backed low-income groups.
64
 
 
Economic ideas in the debates 
Both in France and Spain, MPs debating the issue of progressivity in inheritances taxes 
resourced to well-known economists’ ideas in order to support their lines of reasoning. Even if 
quotations were in many cases instrumental and therefore not strictly accurate, MPs had 
generally an acceptable –and in some cases deep– knowledge of contemporary fiscal literature 
and also of policies applied in other countries. In the case of Spain, quotations of economists 
were larger than in France. The reasons might be two: In Spain sources were mostly from 
foreign economists, especially French. It is expectable that these quotations might have a 
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 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4032. All the opposition joined this argument: Gamazo deemed the 
progressive inheritance tax as confiscation, and also did Moret. Suárez Inclán believed that progressivity 
discouraged capital accumulation. DSC 1899-1900, 117, p. 4005; 119, p. 4070; and 120, p. 4096 
60
 This shows that Villaverde did not have the support of his own parliamentary group. These opinions 
were not unanimous: Romero Robledo, contrary to progressivity, denied that Villaverde’s plan would 
cause a general introduction of fiscal progressivity in Spain. DSC 1899-1900, 120, p. 4101 and 4104. 
61
 DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4060. 
62
 López Puigcerver was the main supporter of this position. In his opinion, property transfer taxes 
existed just because they were easy to implement. DSC 1899-1900, 117, p. 4005; and 118, p. 4030. 
Azcárate, a defender of progressivity, also believed that taxes on property transmission were unjustified, 
as they only represented government eagerness to tax every human activity. DSC 1899-1900, 119, pp. 
4058-4060. 
63
 Moret insisted that progressivity was arbitrary, and therefore, unfair. DSC 1899-1900, 117, p. 4005; 
and 119, p. 4072. 
64
 Other reasoning used by liberals was that progressive taxes were forbidden in the Constitution of 
1876. This was quite a restrictive interpretation of the constitutional text: It just stated that the 
population should contribute to the expenses of the public administrations proportionally to their 
wealth. At the end of the debate, López Puigcerver uttered that the progressive inheritance tax was not 
necessary even for revenue collecting reason: projected revenues could be easily raised with the old 
proportional system. DSC 1899-1900, 118, pp. 4023, 4029 and 4044; 119, p. 4062; and 120, p. 4102. 
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larger impact than in France, where these economists were more well-known. Second, in 
France the issue of progressivity had already emerged in the Chamber during discussions on 
the income tax; whereas in Spain this was the first big debate on progressivity.  
Were there direct quotations or not, the big idea at debate in both parliamentary discussions 
was the notion of tax justice, namely the ability to pay taxes linked to the idea of equality of 
sacrifice, and whether the latter might call for progressive taxation. In both countries, the vast 
majority of MPs believed that the tax system should be proportional. However, the presence 
of indirect taxes, especially on consumption goods, prevented this proportionality. A form to 
correct this unfair circumstance was to implement progressive rates in some taxes. Income tax 
was regarded with great suspicion (it would require inquisitive methods to assess tax debt, it 
would discourage work and investment, it charged the industrious leaving the idle untaxed, 
etc.), but succession tax seemed suitable to implement this taxation technique. Actually, this 
debate reflects well the economic doctrines on the role of the government sustained by most 
liberal economists at that time. The state should not have redistributive functions, and taxes 
should be small, just to finance state's basic services. These authors stood for proportionality 
as the right way to allocate tax burden, but also considered compensatory devices if the tax 
system resulted regressive.
65
 Many of these economists belonged to the French liberal school, 
and their ideas emerged in the debates: Garnier, Leroy-Beaulieu, L. Say.
66
 Other authors had 
different perspectives, but were not so appreciated by political elites in parliaments: Mill, or 
Wagner and the Chair Socialists.  
Reports and bills preceding the debate on the succession tax already quoted some economists 
to support the arguments there stated. The Dupuy-Dutemps report on the Burdeau proposal 
of 1894 leant J.S. Mill to defend progressive rates in the inheritance tax: Ability to pay taxes 
was neither proportional to fortune nor to income. Poincaré’s bill was more profuse in his 
regard. Leroy-Beaulieu’s ideas were used to justify the deduction of debts in the assessment of 
tax bill, in a pompous style: “It is impossible to find a more monstrous abuse of public 
authority”.
67
 As for the establishment of progressive rates, this same bill stated that applying 
them in the inheritance tax did not imply accepting the principle of progressive taxation,
68
 
Poincaré justifying this position clinging to the opinion of J.S. Mill, who supported a strong 
progression in inheritance tax rates but not in income tax, and Garnier, who, also supported 
this tax, but in a much milder version. However, Poincaré was careful to distance himself from 
Mill’s radical position of limiting the amount inherited as a way to avoid unmerited wealth 
accumulation: This was “contrary to the modern notion of individual proprietorship”, which 
represents freedom and progress, because it would entail a shared right of property between 
the individual and the state. 
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 This was described by Seligman as one of the most powerful motives to defend a very limited 
progressivity. Seligman (1894), 224. 
66
 On the ideas of French liberal economists on progressive taxation, see for instance Silvant (2010) and 
Le Van-Lemesle (2006).  
 
67
 Poincaré (1894), Annexe 885, p. 622. 
68
Poincaré’s tax did not match the ordinary objections to progressivity: It did not entail surcharging 
hard-working individuals, while being relatively less lenient to the lazy, as inheritance was not the 
outcome of one’s activity (he quoted J.S. Mill and Carrel) 
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Supporters of progressivity in the debate in the French Chamber hardly used quotations from 
economists, thus renouncing to this effective way of underpinning their reasoning. However, 
they were following the widespread argument of liberal authors that a sound fiscal system 
should be proportional, but accepted progressive rates in some taxes in order to attain overall 
proportionality. Among French fiscal authors this was the case of Leroy-Beaulieu and Garnier. 
As it has been said, Mill’s authority was invoked to support the progressive succession tax, but 
exclusively on the conceptual field, as Mill’s ideas on inheritances were far more progressive 
than the plans debated in either of the Chambers. It is remarkable that French most radical 
supporters of progressivity did not invoke the doctrines by Wagner or other Chair Socialists, 
who were so fond of using public finance as active policy instruments for redistribution. 
French opposition to progressivity used many quotations to back their arguments. Cochin leant 
on Adam Smith to question the legitimacy of the succession tax itself: This was unfair, because 
it was unequal. It charged fortune as a consequence of the random of death, but the same 
fortune might be taxed several times in a few years. This criticism also applies to 
proportionality; however, progressivity aggravates this situation. Cochin also quoted Proudhon 
against progressive tax: The idea of equality of citizens concerning taxation referred clearly to 
proportionality, as the tax should be charged on the thing, and not on the person.
69
 Adaptation 
of authors to MP’s strategies had a case with Adam Smith: Bascou quoted him (however he 
acknowledged that he was also invoked by opponents of progressivity) to defend progressivity. 
Bascou could not find anything in Smith’s doctrine against progressive tax: At most, Smith said 
that there might be some objections.
70
 
Interventions in the French debate by Léon Say, a reputed specialist in public finances, who 
would be very quoted by Spanish MPs, are of particular interest. There Say summarized his 
beliefs concerning progressive taxation. In his opinion, taxes are a necessary evil, therefore 
they should be as small as possible, and serve exclusively to face public expenditure, not 
having redistributive aims. Equality in taxation means equality in the eyes of the Law, and this 
means proportional taxes, as it was the commandment of 1789. Thus Say summarized taxation 
ideas in two doctrines: First, taxes should serve to collect money for public expenditure; 
second, taxes should serve to modify wealth distribution. The proportional tax is the tax that 
better ensures an equal allocation of the tax; progressive tax is, on the contrary, the most 
efficient means of redistributing wealth, this is, the most efficient tool of socialist doctrines. 
Progressivity meant opening to socialism, and the government was serving socialism by 
considering progressive taxation.
71
 Say used other arguments (in some occasions demagogic): 
The government intention to use the increase in revenues to balance the budget would mean 
that, as succession taxpayers were only a very small fraction of all French taxpayers, they 
would hold the burden of the adjustment.
72
 He also quoted Bentham to say that capitals were 
being destroyed by taxes and that it was necessary to avoid that a large part of the inheritance 
be absorbed by succession tax. Finally, he warned that the British example would not work in 
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 Cochin, ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, pp. 175-176. Cochin added that in the problem of progressive tax there 
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 Bascou, ACD-DP (1895), t. 47,  p. 209. 
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 Say ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, pp. 208-212. His interventions were extremely hostile to the socialist group. 
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 Say ACD-DP (1895), t. 47, pp. 214. 
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France: England’s rates were higher than the French project, but in England real estate 
property was half of the French. Therefore, this tax would harm much more French taxpayers 
than English, where larger proportion of property was financial assets. French capital was 
represented by land much more than in England.
73
 
Doumer dared to quote Léon Say himself. According to Doumer, Say stated that progressivity 
in the succession tax presented less problems than progressivity in the income tax (and 
therefore, it was possible to implement). Doumer said that Say’s works quoted Smith, showing 
that he justified progressivity in successions. Later, Doumer again quoted Say and Smith to 
justify the idea that it is fair to establish taxes to correct unfairness caused by other taxes. This 
suited Doumer’s bill, as it exempted small properties and surcharged big properties. His 
conclusion was that the government’s financial policy was a policy of fairness.
74
 Deschanel’s 
intervention at the end of the debate, using Mill’s ideas, also insisted that  objections against a 
progressive income tax were not present in the succession tax.
75
 
In Spain, MPs in the debate clearly tried to reinforce their lines of reasoning referring to 
renowned economists. Both sides mentioned Leroy-Beaulieu and Léon Say’s ideas profusely; 
Garnier’s limited progressivity was the crucial reference for Villaverde and fellows; and J.S. Mill 
and J.B. Say were also quoted. Socialist theories of taxation emerged in the debate: Wagner 
was quoted to discard his ideas on taxation as a mechanism of wealth redistribution. In all, 
French liberal authors were the most quoted, it mirroring Spanish economic thought 
framework, pegged to economic liberalism and very influenced by French economists.
76
 
Opponents to progressive taxation grounded their arguments on the theoretical framework 
supplied by Leroy-Beaulieu and Léon Say, particularly Moret and López Puigcerver. Leroy-
Beaulieu clearly stood against tax progressivity, rejecting its theoretical foundations (the 
theory of equality of sacrifice) for being “sentimental” and not reasonable. In his opinion, 
progressivity was useless if it was mild, and extremely harmful if it was heavy. The diffusion of 
progressivity would create impossible and unfair situations, leading to confiscation of every 
increase in income. For this reason, mathematical progressivity was impossible to apply, and 
some techniques had been devised to limit it.
77
 Leroy highlighted the arbitrary characteristic of 
progressivity and its tendency towards the correction of social inequalities, which he deemed 
“dangerous”.
78
 Léon Say agreed with Leroy in the principle of “national solidarity” as the base 
for allocating tax burden, rejecting the theory of equality of sacrifice, and also in the 
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 Historicists and Chair Socialists were also known, but their ideas were mostly rejected as they 
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 Leroy-Beaulieu (1906), pp. 178 and 186-189. Leroy said that J.B. Say’s system to limit progressivity 
avoided the whole income to be absorbed by the tax, but, anyway, rates made it intolerable. 
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 Leroy believed that progressive tax was not useful because the wealth taxed to high rates was not big 
enough so as to provide large revenues, and rich people would try to commit fraud. Leroy-Beaulieu 
(1906), pp. 182-183, 190, 200-202 and 214. 
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impossibility of a mathematical progressivity: It had been replaced with a “rationally limited 
progression” (Garnier’s “progressional tax” style), which applied progressive rates not to the 
whole tax base, but to the increases of tax base. In Say’s opinion, it was impossible to 
scientifically determine the rate of progressivity, as the inequality of sacrifice could not be 
measured in money. Like Leroy, he feared the consequences of progressive taxation: if rates 
were high, it destroyed capital; if moderate, they did not supply but very short revenues.
79
 All 
these ideas were put forward by liberal MPs in the debate, they closely following these two 
authors, particularly Leroy. This influence was openly acknowledged: López Puigcerver 
followed Leroy’s Traité de la science des finances in his discourses, whereas Moret used Say’s 
Les solutions démocratiques de la question des impôts.80 
MPs in favour of progressivity grounded their argumentation on ideas by J.S. Mill, Jean-
Baptiste Say and Garnier, but also on Leroy-Beaulieu and L. Say’s exceptions. Villaverde 
justified his progressive tax project on Mill’s theories, which rejected tax progressivity in 
general, but accepted it for inheritance taxes (although Mill’s reasons to apply progressive 
rates in inheritances were far from Villaverde’s).
81
 He also leant on J.B. Say’s Traité.82 Villaverde 
claimed that his concrete plan was inspired on Garnier’s “progressional proportionality” 
(actually he only used the word “progressivity” to refer to redistributive taxes defended by 
Wagner and the Chair Socialists). Azcárate based his support to progressivity on Garnier’s 
model, also explicitly rejecting Wagner’s redistribution. He recognized that Leroy and L. Say 
discarded progressivity in general (even the “progressional” form), but he justified a limited 
progressivity as the exception those authors accepted in order to compensate systemic 
regressivity caused by indirect taxation.
83
 
A good example of misuses of economists’ ideas is actually Leroy and L. Say: These authors 
accepted the compensatory exception for progressivity in systems with indirect taxes. Leroy 
called this impôt degressif, which would relieve totally or partially low tax bases, but then 
charging the rest of taxpayers with a uniform tax rate. L. Say also accepted this idea, 
suggesting a tax relief to the lowest tax bases.
84
 Leroy’s ideas could perfectly support 
arguments against progressivity (López Puigcerver quoted him), but not the opposite position, 
as his degressif exception did not fit Villaverde’s reform (Azcárate was not right when using 
Leroy’s exception). Neither was López Puigcerver when quoting Proudhon’s censure of 
progressive taxes (this author deemed all taxes, as they were currently constituted, unfair);
85
 
nor Villaverde’s quotation of Mill’s inheritance tax. In any case, many liberal economists were 
rather ambiguous in their ideas about taxation, which allowed politicians to make use of these 
sources quite comfortably. As it has been said, Villaverde did not back his reform with the 
argument of compensation. Garnier was the author that best fitted his project, with his 
“progressional” system. Probably the only clear support for progressivity would be Chair 
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 Léon Say (1886), pp. 172-173 and (1894), p. 365 
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 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4044; and 119, pp. 4067-4068 and 4072. López Puigcerver stated that L. Say 
had opposed Poincaré’s progressive tax reform in France 1894. 
81
 DSC 1899-1900, 118, pp. 4039-4040; and 120, pp. 4108-4109. See Mill (1987). 
82
 “Taxation cannot be equitable, unless its ratio is progressive”. J.B. Say (2001), p. 455. 
83
 DSC 1899-1900, 119, pp. 4060-4061 and 4069. 
84
 Leroy-Beaulieu (1906), pp. 203-205; Léon Say (1894), p. 366; (1886), pp. 180, 185 and 190-192. 
85
 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4040; Proudhon (1868), p. 185. 
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Socialists. But this source could not be used, because of the widespread rejection of socialism 
among upper classes in Spain. The absence of quotations of Spanish economists to support 
MPs’ arguments is remarkable, in spite of the facts that public finance was a fashionable topic 
in contemporaneous Spanish economic literature and that some valuable works on fiscal 
matters had been produced in this period. Probably quoting first-rate international economists 
served more MPs’ goals.
86
 
 
Conclusions 
At the end of the 19
th
 century some Western European countries introduced progressive rates 
in the succession tax. The main reasoning was that their fiscal systems failed to achieve 
proportionality (as they should be), as a consequence of indirect taxes. Progressive rates in the 
succession tax would be a compensative device to restore the general proportionality in the 
system. Following the example of England, the governments of France and Spain brought to 
their national parliaments projects in this regard, opening lively debates. 
These debates show that new perspectives of tax justice were entering European politics at 
that time. Ideas that ability to pay was proportional to the individual income or wealth, and 
that taxes should fall on things and not individuals were still predominant and well supported 
by numerous economists, but the introduction of progressivity in the inheritance tax was a 
first step in the acknowledgement that equality of sacrifice might call for progressive taxes.  
The political processes towards it were hard, but eventually both countries succeeded almost 
contemporarily. The expansion of progressivity to other taxes, particularly the income tax, 
which was being debated often, would be a matter of time. 
Almost all these MPs shared a common economic thought framework, that of economic 
liberalism, with the only exception of French socialists. These economic ideas were present in 
the parliamentary discussions: MPs incorporated fiscal ideas and debates of economists in 
their discourses, invoking them as sources of authority to underpin their lines of reasoning. In 
many occasions they used direct quotations, however, even if they did not do that, the ideas 
they used to support or attack progressivity were easy to identify. Liberal economic thought 
ideas on taxation and the role of the state were absolutely predominant in both Chambers, 
particularly those by French liberal economists. Leaving apart the socialist group, all MPs 
believed that the right allocation of tax burden was through proportional taxation. However 
they acknowledged that indirect taxes broke this rule, on behalf of which many of them 
accepted progressivity as a compensatory effect, succession tax supplying with suitable 
characteristics. Justification of progressivity was set on behalf of larger contributing faculty 
based on the unexpectedness of wealth accrue, and less on ideas on equality. In this regard, 
the debates can be said to have been just technical, on the pros and cons of establishing 
progressive rates in the succession tax. There was not a debate on social justice implications of 
progressivity, as progressivity as a device for economic policy, namely redistribution, was 
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 The only exception, although his name was not cited, was Piernas Hurtado. His ideas were mentioned, 
not on the issue of progressivity, but concerning the general taxation model. Piernas referred to the 
progressivity debate in the 1900-1901 edition of his Tratado de Hacienda Pública: He stated that neither 
progressivity nor proportionality could really achieve tax equity. Piernas (1900-1901), pp. 291-300. 
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unthinkable as an attribution of the government. This makes sense in the liberal parliaments at 
the end of the 19
th
 century, with its limited representativeness. MPs (socialists the only 
exception) were defending the values of the liberal system grounded on property rights, a 
limited state and economic freedom. 
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